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Introduction 
Many cities around the world are presently pursuing a smart cities agenda in which 
networked ICTs are positioned and utilized to try to solve urban issues, drive local and 
regional economies, and foster civic initiatives. Regardless of whether cities have formulated 
and are implementing smart city visions, missions and policies, all cities of scale utilise a 
number of smart city technologies (e.g., intelligent transport systems, urban control rooms, 
smart grids, sensor networks, building management systems, urban informatics) to manage 
city services and infrastructures and to govern urban life (see Table 1.1). In this sense, we are 
already living in the smart city age, with assemblages of networked technologies being used 
to mediate many aspects of everyday life (e.g., work, consumption, communication, travel, 
service provision, domestic living), with the trend moving towards evermore computation 
being embedded into the urban fabric, previously dumb objects and processes becoming 
‘smart’ in some fashion, and services being shaped by or delivered in conjunction with digital 
platforms (Kitchin and Dodge 2011). Smart city agendas corral the development and use of 
these technologies into a rhetoric and agenda in which digital technologies are championed as 
commonsensical, pragmatic solutions to all the ills of city life. 
 
Table 1.1: Smart city technologies 
Domain Example technologies 
Government E-government systems; online transactions; city operating systems; 
performance management systems; urban dashboards 
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Security and emergency services Centralised control rooms; digital surveillance; predictive policing; 
coordinated emergency response  
Transport Intelligent transport systems; integrated ticketing; smart travel cards; 
bikeshare; real-time passenger information; smart parking; logistics 
management; transport apps; dynamic road signs 
Energy Smart grids; smart meters; energy usage apps; smart lighting 
Waste Compactor bins and dynamic routing/collection 
Environment IoT sensor networks (e.g., pollution, noise, weather; land movement; 
flood management); dynamically responsive interventions (e.g., 
automated flood defenses)  
Buildings Building management systems; sensor networks 
Homes Smart meters; app controlled smart appliances  
Source: Kitchin (2016) 
 
The smart city agenda builds upon and extends a longer history of computationally 
networked urbanism that has been in progress from the early 1970s and variously labelled 
‘wired cities’ (Dutton et al. 1987), ‘cyber cities’ (Graham and Marvin 1999), ‘digital cities’ 
(Ishida and Isbister 2000), ‘intelligent cities’ (Komninos 2002), ‘networked cities’ (Hanley 
2004), ‘sentient cities’ (Shepard 2011), among others (Kitchin 2014; Willis and Augiri 2018) 
and overlap with other popular, current city framings (e.g., resilient cities, sustainable cities, 
safe cities, eco-cities). In contrast to earlier formulations of networked urbanism, smart cities 
as a concept, aspiration, and an assemblage of products, rapidly gained traction in industry, 
government and academia from the late 2000s onwards to become a global urban agenda (see 
Willis and Augiri 2018). In large part, this is because it has been actively promoted by a well-
organized epistemic community (a knowledge and policy community), advocacy coalition (a 
collective of vested interests), and a cohort of embedded technocrats in new governmental 
roles (chief information officers, chief technology officers, chief data officers, data scientists, 
smart city policy specialists, software engineers, and IT project managers) (Kitchin et al., 
2017). Beyond city administrations, many consultancies are offering specialist smart city 
services, tech companies have created new smart city units/divisions, and universities have 
founded smart city research centres. In just a handful of years, a number of smart city 
consortia of aligned actors have been formed at different scales (global, supra-national, 
national and local), each claiming to provide authoritative, neutral, expert advice, resources, 
and partnerships that can cut through the complexities of managing cities by using digital 
technologies to solve difficult issues/problems (Kitchin et al., 2017). 
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Given this step change in activity and the embracing of smart city rhetoric and the 
formulation of associated policy and funding programmes by governmental bodies, the 
emerging market for smart city technologies, and the potential consequences with respect to 
urban living, management and governance, not unsurprisingly the concept of a smart city and 
the drive to create ‘actually existing smart cities’ (Shelton et al., 2015) has attracted much 
media, scholarly (including fundamental and applied research), policy and corporate 
attention. However, the focus, intention, and ethos of smart city ideas, approaches and 
products remains quite fragmented and often quite polarised across and within these domains.   
On the one side are those that seek to develop and implement smart city technologies 
and initiatives, often with little or no critical reflection on how they fit into and reproduce a 
particular form of political economy and their wider consequences beyond their desired 
effects (such as improving efficiency, productivity, competitiveness, sustainability, resilience, 
safety, security, etc). Typically, this grouping is composed of scientists, technologists, and 
technocrats working in universities (in disciplines such as Computer Science, Data Science, 
Civil Engineering), companies, and government. When challenged about some of the 
underlying assumptions used in developing their technologies, or the problematic ways in 
which their inventions are being used, they try to side-step the critique by claiming that: they 
employ a mechanical objectivity in their work, thus ensuring that it is neutral and non-
ideological; they are developing what society, the market and city administrations want or 
need; and they are not responsible for how their products are used in practice. Their role is to 
create technologies that solve instrumental problems, such as how make a process more 
sustainable, efficient or cost-effective, not to evaluate whether it is the most appropriate 
solution or to address wider social, political and philosophical issues of fairness, equity, 
justice, citizenship, democracy, governance and political economy (though they may try to 
utilise these notions in promoting/marketing their solution); those are the remit of 
practitioners, policy-makers, politicians, and social movements. 
On the other are those that critique such initiatives from political, ethical and 
ideological perspectives, focusing on issues of power, capital, equality, participation, 
citizenship, labour, surveillance, and alternative forms of urbanism, but provide little 
constructive and pragmatic (technical, practical, policy, legal) feedback that would address 
their concerns and provide an alternative vision of what a smart city might be. Much of this 
critique has emerged from the social sciences (especially Geography, Urban Studies, Science 
and Technology Studies, and Sociology) and civil organisations. They contend that smart city 
technologies are never neutral, objective, non-ideological in nature, both with respect to how 
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they are conceived and developed, and how they are promoted. Smart city technologies they 
argue prioritise a technological solutionist approach to issues (Morozov 2013; Mattern 2013), 
rather than solutions that are more political, fiscal, policy, deliberative, and community 
development orientated, and they inherently have certain values embedded in them which 
produce particular kinds of solutions (Greenfield 2013). The smart city they contend 
facilitates and produces instrumental, functionalist, technocratic, top-down forms of 
governance and government (Kitchin 2014; Vanolo 2014); are underpinned by an ethos of 
stewardship (for citizens) or civic paternalism (what is best for citizens) rather than involving 
active citizen participation in addressing local issues (Shelton and Lodato, this volume; 
Cardullo and Kitchin 2018); and often provide ‘sticking plaster’ or ‘work around’ solutions, 
rather than tackling the root and structural causes of issues. With respect to how they are 
promoted, smart city initiatives often leverage from neoliberal arguments concerning the 
limitations of public sector competencies, inefficiencies in service delivery, and the need for 
marketization of state services and infrastructures. Public authorities, it is argued, lack the 
core skills, knowledges and capacities to address pressing urban issues and maintain critical 
services and infrastructures. Instead, they need to draw on the competencies held within 
industry and academia that can help deliver better solutions through public-private 
partnerships, leasing, deregulation and market competition, or outright privatization (Kitchin 
et al., 2017). In turn, the logic of a reliable, low-cost, universal government provision in the 
public interest is supplemented or replaced by provision through the market, driven in-part or 
substantively by private interests (Graham and Marvin 2001; Collier et al., 2016). Luque-
Ayala and Marvin (2015: 2105) thus argue there is “an urgent need to critically engage with 
why, how, for whom and with what consequences smart urbanism is emerging in different 
urban contexts.”  
Smart city protagonists then are largely divided into those that advocate for the 
promise or warn of the perils of smart cities (see Table 1.2). That said, we would 
acknowledge that this division is somewhat of an over-simplification. Over time, many of 
those promoting smart cities have come to recognize that they need to be more mindful of 
critiques, often trying to reframe smart city interventions in ways that are more citizen-centric 
and complementary to other approaches for tackling urban issues – though often it is the 
discursive framing that it is recast, rather than the fundamental principles and implementation 
of technologies/initiatives; Kitchin 2015a). Moreover, they have come to realise that 
implementing a smart city initiative/strategy consists of a complex set of tasks and politics 
that are difficult to resolve in practice and require multi-stakeholder negotiations, policy 
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changes, and investments to address. For example, beyond the concerns that critics typically 
focus on (as set out in Table 1.3) the 42 interviewees – from local government, state agencies, 
business, universities, civic bodies active in smart city initiatives in Dublin – that were 
interviewed in a sub-project of The Programmable City project1 discussed over 60 different 
issues that can be characterised as ‘critique, challenges and risks’ with regards to Dublin 
becoming a smart city, nearly all of which are practical, pragmatic, organisational, and 
institutional in nature (concerning issues such as personnel capacity/competency, 
funding/procurement, processes and procedures, structures, coordination, priorities, strategy, 
leadership, policy/law, competing interests, etc.), rather than being political or ideological 
(see Figure 1). Similarly, many critics have recognized that smart city technologies do 
provide workable solutions for some urban issues, are often well-liked by citizens, and such 
technologies are not only here to stay but are going to become more entrenched in the future.  
Their focus of attention is thus on modifying the formulation and ethos of smart city 
initiatives and implementing them in ways that minimize perils, rather than seeking their 
abandonment.  
 
Table 1.2: The promise and perils of smart cities 
Promises2 Perils3 
Will tackle urban problems in ways that maximize 
control, reduce costs, and improve services, and do 
so in commonsensical, pragmatic, neutral and 
apolitical ways through technical solutions. 
Treats the city as a knowable, rational, steerable 
machine, rather than a complex system full of 
wicked problems and competing interests. 
Will create a smart economy by fostering 
entrepreneurship, innovation, productivity, 
competiveness, and inward investment. 
Promotes a strong emphasis on technical solutions 
and overly promotes top-down technocratic forms 
of governance, rather than political/social solutions 
and citizen-centred deliberative democracy. 
Will enable smart government by enabling new 
forms of e-government, new modes of operational 
governance, improved models and simulations to 
guide future development, evidence-informed 
decision making, and better service delivery, and by 
making government more transparent, participatory 
and accountable. 
Solutions treat cities as ahistorical and aspatial and 
as generic markets, promoting one-size fits all 
technical fixes rather than recognising local 
specificities.  
Will produce smart mobility by creating intelligent 
transport systems and efficient, inter-operable 
multi-modal public transport, better and dynamic 
routing, and real-time information for passengers 
and drivers. 
The technologies deployed are positioned as being 
objective, commonsensical, pragmatic and politically 
benign, rather than thoroughly political, reflecting 
the views and values of their developers and 
stakeholders. 
Will make smart environments by promoting and 
creating sustainability and resilience and the 
development of green energy. 
Promotes the corporatisation and privatisation of 
city services, with the developers of smart city 
technologies capturing city functions as market 
opportunities which are run for profit rather than 
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the public good, and potentially create propriety 
technological lock-ins. 
Will create smart living by improving quality of life, 
increasing choice, utility, safety and security, and 
reducing risk. 
Prioritises the values and investments of vested 
interests, reinforces inequalities, and deepens levels 
of control and regulation, rather than creating a 
more socially just and equal society. 
Will produce smart people by creating a more 
informed citizenry and fostering creativity, 
inclusivity, empowerment and participation. 
The technologies deployed have profound social, 
political and ethical effects: introducing new forms 
of social regulation, control and governance; 
extending surveillance and eroding privacy; and 
enabling predictive profiling, social sorting and 
behavioural nudging. 
 The technologies deployed potentially produce 
buggy, brittle and hackable urban systems which 
create systemic vulnerabilities across critical 
infrastructure and compromise data security, rather 
than producing stable, reliable, resilient, secure 
systems. 
 
Source: Based on analysis in Kitchin (2015b), see endnotes 2 and 3 for specific sources of promises and perils. 
 
Table 1.3: Critique, challenges and risks in seeking to become a smart city 
 
Critique/challenges/risks 
• Antagonism/conflict/misunderstanding 
between stakeholders 
• Best practice 
• Business case issues 
• Capacity issues/staffing 
• City complex systems 
• City requires stability/risk adverse 
• Communication to public 
• Competing interests 
• Competitiveness 
• Creating impact 
• Cultural mindset 
• Data dumps/quality/governance 
• Data protection/privacy 
• Data security 
• Digital divide/inclusion 
• Drift in roles 
• Endless experimentation/pilots 
• Future proofing 
• How to prioritize/assess proposals 
• Ignores planning system/process 
• Internal politics/inertia 
• IP, NDAs and legal issues 
• Lack of clear route to engagement 
• Lack of economy of scale 
• Lack of inclusion of citizens 
• Lack of investment/finance 
 
• Mismatch needs/solutions 
• Multinational/jobs focused 
• Need action not talk 
• Need alignment with wider planning 
• Need bespoke solutions 
• Need champions 
• Need CIO, CTO, CDO 
• Need for education/data literacy 
• Need for joined-up thinking/coordination 
• Need for strategy/sense of direction 
• Non-interoperability/lack of integration 
• Not using locally-sited industry 
• Path dependency 
• Political geography of city 
• Poor choice/implementation 
• Privatisation 
• Procurement issues 
• Proprietary systems/data 
• Resistance 
• Scepticism 
• Setbacks 
• Solutionism 
• Standardisation/standards 
• Surveillance 
• Sustainability 
• Too many barriers to implementation 
• Unanticipated consequences 
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• Lack of national level support 
• Lack of openness 
• Lack of opportunities 
• Lack of proper implementation 
• Lack of transparency 
• Lack of trust in government 
• Legacy infrastructure 
• Local authorities lack nimbleness 
 
• Under-utilisation of installed tech 
• Unofficial state aid 
• Upgrade treadmill 
• Variances between local authorities 
• Vendor-led rather than city- or citizen-led 
• Wasting investment 
• Weak governance/leadership 
 
Source: MAXQDA coding of Rob Kitchin’s Dublin interviews (conducted 4th Feb to 7th May 2015) 
 
The collection of essays in this book seek to bridge the gap between advocates and 
critics by critically examining the production of smart cities and suggesting new visions of 
smart urbanism that seek to gain some of the promises of networked ICT while addressing 
some of their more problematic aspects. Indeed, it is fair to say that none of the contributors 
are against the use of new innovative technologies per se to help mitigate urban issues, but 
they are all cautious and concerned about how smart city initiatives envisage and deploy 
technologies and re-imagine how cities should be governed and managed. Thus conceived, 
the book explores the various critiques of smart city rhetoric and deployments and to suggest 
social, political and practical interventions that would enable better designed and more 
equitable and just smart city initiatives. In particular, the essays explore the benefits of smart 
city initiatives while recasting the thinking and ethos underpinning them and addressing their 
deficiencies, limitations, and perils. The essays were initially drafted in advance of an invited 
workshop that took place in September 2016 as part of a European Research Council funded 
project, The Programmable City (ERC-2012-AdG-323636).   
 
The political economy of smart cities 
The first half of the book considers issues of political economy, including how smart cities 
are framed and promoted, how they are sustained by and reproduced particular formations of 
power and regulation, and how they shape patterns of economic development. The chapters 
highlight how smart cities need to be reimagined in new ways that enable technologies to be 
deployed to aid city management but which are less technocratic, more inclusive in 
orientation, and do not simply serve the interests of capital and elites. 
In Chapter 2, Jathan Sadowski calls attention to the ways in which the smart city is 
not merely an assemblage of technologies, but rather a concerted attempt to enact a neoliberal 
transformation of urban governance. He divides his analysis into two parts. In the first, he 
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contends that the push for smart cities has been driven by two sets of processes: austerity and 
accumulation. In a time where cities are starved of resources they are forced to seek to do 
more with less and compete in the global marketplace for investment. Technological 
solutions offer cities a pathway towards efficiency, entrepreneurialism, and economic 
development. At the same time, these technologies provide a means of generating and 
accumulating a massive amount of data about people, places and systems that underpin a new 
data-driven economy, which is also reshaping the operation of urban governance. These twin 
drivers (re)produce technocratic, neoliberal urbanism. In the second part of the paper, he sets 
out an alternative view, contending that ‘the smart city is a battle for our imagination’ and it 
is necessary to offer other ways to re-imagine and reframe more progressive smart cities. The 
model he offers, the Digital Deal, is modelled on the New Deal policies that were 
implemented in the United States during the Great Depression. Whereas the New Deal was 
based on the three principles of relief, recovery, and reform, the Digital Deal he advocates for 
is based on participation (by citizens in visioning and programmes), protection (from the 
excesses of data accumulation), and progress (towards a more a just, equitable, prosperous 
city for all). Without new visions and politics of smartness, he argues that city leaders and 
decision makers are provided with limited and limiting urban imaginaries of the present and 
future city. 
Over the past decade there has been a number of initiatives to create standards for 
smart cities and their associated technologies. James Merricks White explores two key 
questions with respect to such standardisation projects: what do smart city standards attempt 
to standardise? and, what do they hope to achieve by doing so? He argues that standards seek 
to map out and formalise the systems that compose smart city assemblages. This is important, 
as producing and adopting standards enables the mediation of the relationship between supply 
and demand in the market for city services and technologies by providing certainty in 
knowledge and systems, stability in consumer demand, and permits benchmarking and 
interoperability and the breakdown of system silos. He contends that the creation of standards 
is shaped by three orders of knowledge – systems theory, neoliberalism, and governance – 
each of which he details with respect to a different standard making initiative: City Protocol 
Anatomy, BSI PAS 181, and ISO 37120. He then describes points of contradictions and 
conflicts in what he calls the ‘field of possibilities’. These show standardisation to be an 
intensely political and normative act that posits ideas about how the world is and ought to be. 
His chapter highlights one aspect of the political work undertaken to produce particular 
visions of smart cities, namely putting in place technical specifications for particular 
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technologies and guidelines for how smart cities should be measured and governed. An 
alternative vision for smart cities needs to undermine or operate in this terrain if it is to 
provide a counter the present dominant vision, for example, setting out standards for the 
ethical use of smart city technologies and embedding privacy-by-design and security-by-
design as core orientations.  
Alan Wiig provides a detailed case study of the surveillance capitalism that lies at the 
heart of much smart city technology. His focus is the city of Camden in New Jersey, United 
States, a city that has been in decline for decades and is blighted by high rates of deprivation 
and crime, but whose waterfront is being regenerated through $800 million in public and 
private investment, with another $1.2 billion being invested elsewhere in the city. A key part 
of the strategy to encourage and protect such investment, and to re-imagine the city, has been 
the rollout of an automated, militarized surveillance and policing system. This has included 
the use an ‘Eye in the Sky’ camera network, an interactive community alert network 
(an anonymous, online neighborhood crime watch), automated license plate readers that can 
track vehicle movement, and a body-worn camera program for police officers, with the data 
flowing into an urban control room and into predictive policing software. Here, economic 
development and a militarized surveillance grid and policing practices are synergistically 
intertwined, with the city becoming a market for repurposed military technologies and 
expertise, and the securitised city protecting the interests of capital and enabling orderly and 
planned economic development. This is a city of cybernetic control that seeks to capture and 
contain undesirable behaviour. While Camden is a relatively exceptional case in terms of its 
scope and depth, the assemblage of technologies detailed are being deployed extensively 
across cities, particularly in North America, and provide a salutary example of how 
surveillance capitalism is being used to produce securitised smart cities. There is clearly 
much to be concerned about with respect to civil liberties and new forms of city governance 
in such an assemblage, but as yet there have been little sustained interventions to reverse such 
deployments where they have been rolled out. 
Félix Talvard also considers the links between economic development and smart 
cities, but does so by focusing on the assembling of economic performance and social 
inclusiveness, rather than securitisation. His case example is Medellín in Columbia, a city 
once ranked as one of the most dangerous on the planet. However, whereas the Camden 
example ensnares the local population in a grid of control designed to shackle their actions, 
Medellín has sought to enrol public and private actors to build consensus on how the city 
should be organized politically and economically. Talvard focuses on one key initiative, 
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Medellinnovation, a specially designated district that acts as a site of urban experimentations 
and seeks to attract transnational investment. Unlike other smart districts that seek to 
minimize or control who lives in them, Medellinnovation is located in an existing 
neighbourhood and engages with the local community, with a stated aim of serving them 
rather than producing gentrification that pushes existing residents away from the area. In this 
sense, the community are invited into the practices of urban experimentation and learning 
taking place. However, while Medellín has sought to become what city administration terms 
an ‘inclusive and competitive smart city’, Talvard details it still delivers a ‘rather paternalistic 
and market-oriented notion of smartness’ and follows a linear path of development that 
favours the interests of commercial actors. He thus concludes that despite the emphasis on 
social inclusion, it appears that there has been a ‘corporate capture of the public interest 
masquerading as local development’. However, he contends that the situation is more 
complex in practice, with the city authorities aware of such criticism and have sought to 
counter ‘smart imperialism’ by adapting rather than copying best practices from elsewhere. 
Despite the specific governance and funding circumstances of Medellín, it is clear that some 
of the normative ideas being developed and practised in the city are transferable elsewhere 
(indeed this is ambition of the city administration). It would, for example, be interesting to 
see how they would be grounded in a city like Camden. 
Similarly, Liam Heaphy and Réka Pétercsák examine the creation of a smart district 
in area of brownfield sites and old working class residential neighbours in the Dublin 
docklands. Formally designated as a ‘strategic development zone’ (SDZ), the area is a site of 
urban regeneration in which a cluster of mostly foreign direct investment ICT and finance 
multinationals are mixed with high-end apartment complexes and heritage and leisure 
amenities. It has recently been designated the ‘Smart Docklands’, an innovation zone for 
trialling new urban technologies by university research centres and private enterprise. While 
local authorities are still regarded as the main providers of city services, the emerging 
platform of engagement in the area seeks to reshape how services are delivered through new 
forms of partnerships between city authorities, local start-ups and multinationals. The chapter 
highlights two important aspects that is often missing from smart city research to date. First, 
the need to place smart city developments into a longer historical context. Smart Docklands is 
the latest phase in a much longer trajectory of urban and economic development framed 
within an evolving political economy. Rather than start their discussion of the emerging smart 
district with its formal inception in 2016, they begin with the foundation of the state in 1922. 
Second, the need to understand the complex organisational and political work required to 
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initiate, mobilize and sustain initiatives such as Smart Docklands that involve multiple 
stakeholders whom have different motivations and aims. They note that the initiative consists 
of an ecosystem of vested interests that must try to find common ground and work in concert 
to achieve its ends. These are tasks that require much liaison and coordination, and are prone 
to inertia and failure, especially when formal processes and legal and financial frameworks 
are missing or partners do not understand or appreciate the roles and constraints each is 
operating under. They conclude that the challenge for smart cities initiatives is not only to 
develop and trial new urban technologies, but to determine the optimal operational practices 
and organisational frameworks to enable collaborative innovation. This includes local 
residents, not simply public and private stakeholders. 
For Brice Laurent and David Pontille, the real-time policing in Camden, 
Medellinnovation in Medellín, and Smart Dockland in Dublin are forms of city experiments – 
a form of urban trialling and testbedding in which new forms of ‘smart’ governance and 
economic development are being deployed in real-world context. Here, the city becomes a 
living lab in which experimentation is practised as systems are developed and refined. In both 
cases, the technologies and organisational practices are still prototypes, being actively 
developed based on performance, feedback, analysis, and reflection. In their chapter they 
advocate that smart cities are considered as consisting of city experiments, as specific 
initiatives that can be made sense of through a Science and Technology Studies approach that 
focuses on understanding their constituent elements and processes – experimenters, 
experimental subjects and objects, laboratories, and audiences – as well their consequences. 
They illustrate their ideas with respect to two case studies: Virtual Singapore, a dynamic 
three-dimensional simulated city model and collaborative data platform produced through a 
public-private partnership; and MuniMobile, an app developed by the San Francisco 
Municipal Transportation Authority and a non-profit organisation that enables fare purchase 
and trip planning. By focusing on specific initiatives, their praxes, politics, and interlinkages 
to other experiments, rather than on the broad sweep of smart cities writ large, they argue it 
becomes possible to more clearly understand their nature and implications. In essence, they 
are advocating that a deeper understanding of how smart cities are created requires an 
epistemological shift in how we frame and unpack the projects and technologies at work. 
Andrew Karvonen, Chris Martin and James Evans discuss one form and example of 
city experimentation in their chapter on the role of universities as sites and conductors of 
experimental smart urbanism. They note that universities are often ideal living labs for urban 
trials because they are large, single-owner sites that are managed in-house, thus avoiding the 
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political and administrative issues of using public spaces managed by local authorities, they 
can leverage the research and teaching expertise of their staff and actively contribute to those 
endeavours, and they have well-established and trusted links to city administration, 
companies and civil society groups. In this sense, following Laurent and Pontille, university 
living labs have well defined and bounded experimenters, experimental subjects and objects, 
laboratories, and audiences. They focus their analysis on the roles of the University of 
Manchester (UoM) and Manchester Metropolitan University (MMU) in the Triangulum 
project and the wider Corridor Manchester, a knowledge-intensive urban development zone 
extending south from the city centre. They conclude that while university campuses present 
many opportunities for developing and experimenting with smart urbanism, and create a 
number of beneficial effects such as building stronger linkages between stakeholders and 
shaping local urban development, their wider spillover effects with regards local residents 
and driving smart urbanism elsewhere in the city has so far been more limited. A key 
question thus remains as to how to translate testbed urbanism conducted in ‘smart districts’ 
into mainstreamed smart urbanism available to all. This is a key challenge for producing 
more inclusive smart cities. 
 
Smart cities, citizenship and ethics 
As Dan Hill (2013) and a number of others (Gabrys 2014; Datta 2015; Cardullo and Kitchin 
2018) have argued, the vision and deployment of smart cities and the forms of citizenship 
they enact predominately produce technocratic forms of governance that only pay-service to 
meaningful citizen participation. In addition, as Kitchin (2016) details in-depth, there are a 
several ethical implications arising from the assemblage of smart city technologies, including 
forms of dataveillance, social sorting and redlining, predictive profiling and anticipatory 
governance, nudge and behavioural change, control creep, and system security. These issues 
of citizenship and ethics are a significant blind spot in much smart city rhetoric, and if 
addressed are usually only done so through lip service. As the chapters in this section 
highlight, creating inclusive and principled smart cities means a radical rethink in how smart 
cities are framed and implemented. 
 In the opening chapter, Christine Richter, Linnet Taylor, Shazade Jameson and 
Carmen Pérez del Pulgar note that while digital devices and infrastructures are becoming 
ever-more embedded into everyday life, and administrations rollout smart city initiatives, we 
still know relatively little about citizen’s perceptions of such technologies. While there is 
some research concerning specific technologies and platforms, they contend that we know 
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very little about people’s everyday experiences, thoughts, concerns and emotions concerning 
the entire coded assemblage encountered daily. To address this lacuna, they conducted 
interviews with twenty expert stakeholders and conducted focus groups with different 
constituencies in Amsterdam, including non-natives, ethnic and religious minorities, people 
who try to minimize their digital footprint, regulated professions such as sex workers, 
freelance technologists, and school children. Their participants produced a continual refrain 
of concern characterised by ambivalence and insecurity and expressed through four tensions: 
convenience of use and risk of being tracked; visible as citizens and the invisibility of 
watchers; individualized data sharing and structural forces of digitalization; and the 
community of digital citizenry and fragmentation and individualisation of human concerns. 
These concerns are only partially addressed by administrations and companies, who 
continually push the boundaries of datafication and data-driven governance and products. In 
turn, citizenship has become highly individualized, with collective community responses 
fractured and uncoordinated, so while citizens hold many concerns these rarely translate into 
political action. They contend that a truly smart city would enable public concerns to be 
articulated and the use of digital technologies would be rearticulated to take account of them. 
In other words, the smart city needs to find an effective means to shift citizens from users and 
consumers to active stakeholders in order to become more democratic in nature.  
Ayona Datta in her examination of smart citizenship in the drive to create 100 smart 
cities in India notes a similarly benign, post-political conception of citizenship – though one 
rooted in India’s postcolonialism and the nationalism of the present ruling party. She details 
how the consultation process used by cities in the process of producing their applications to 
the government’s smart city challenge (that selected which cities would leverage funding and 
political support to become a smart city) not only set the parameters of how the cities would 
be developed, but set the ideals for the smart citizens that would develop, live and work in 
them. Through a series of online surveys, competitions and infographics, citizens are 
encouraged to perform in ways designed to reproduce the discursive rhetoric they are being 
asked to comment on. This produces what she terms ‘hashtag citizenship’ – a set of jingoistic 
memes that discursively frame the ideal qualities of a smart citizen (e.g., ‘green, honest, 
polite, social, bright, healthy and virtuous’, who seek to ‘be the change, stay on course, feel 
the need, meet the world, yearn to learn, follow the sun, and pass it on’). This is a digital 
citizenship of passive contribution and consumption, rather than rights and entitlements. 
Moreover, given the use of online e-government platforms and social media to undertake the 
consultations, the audience was largely self-selected to be those who already possessed 
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digital skills and were users and developers of ICTs. Such citizens – mainly young, male and 
middle-class – are more likely to be open to the idea that ICT can be used effectively in the 
management of cities, and at the same time excluded many along lines of class, caste, and 
gender. She concludes that the process of creating smart cities in India has become 
‘synonymous with the production of a postcolonial technocratic subjectivity’, with 
production of citizenship practices moving from civil and political society to digital space. 
This redrawing of the political limits of citizenship shifts the boundaries of urban 
participation and democracy, and who gets to embody and perform being a citizen in a smart 
city. Her analysis highlights the need for sustained critical reflection on who smart cities are 
being built for, not only in India but globally. 
In their chapter, Taylor Shelton and Thomas Lodato draw on fieldwork conducted 
within Atlanta’s task force for smart cities to examine what they term the ‘actually existing 
smart citizen’. That is, how citizens are imagined and citizenship enacted in historically and 
geographically specific ways within Atlanta’s smart city vision and programmes of the city. 
They detail that while the city administration and companies often talked of producing a 
citizen-focused smart city, in practice citizens were included as two empty signifiers (both of 
which were also evident in Datta’s Indian cities). The first is what they term a ‘general 
citizen’, wherein the citizen is framed as a catch-all community of seemingly homogenous 
residents and visitors. Here, the city administration and companies envisaged the smart city 
from within the frame of stewardship (delivering on behalf of citizens) and civic paternalism 
(deciding what’s best for citizens). Here, citizens are generic recipients or consumers of 
services, rather than being meaningfully involved in their design and deployment. The second 
is the ‘absent citizen’, referring both to all those diverse communities that hold differing 
identities, values, concerns, and experiences to the ‘general citizen’ (which is largely framed 
as white, male, heterosexual, able-bodied and middle class) and the absence of citizens from 
the processes of formulating and implementing smart city strategies and programmes. Indeed, 
there were no citizens beyond those employed as city administrators, stakeholders and vested 
companies at the events they attended in Atlanta, and nor were there elected officials that 
citizens have chosen to represent them. They conclude with two contentions. First, that a 
truly citizen-focused smart city would adopt strategies to include citizen participation in their 
visioning. Second, that the path to just, equitable and democratic cities may well require a 
radical rethink of the present market- and technology-centric formulation of smart cities than 
simply adding citizens and stirring can supply. The challenge then in creating smart cities is 
to re-imagine citizenship beyond its present formulations. 
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Sung-Yueh Perng documents the politics and praxes of urban and public 
experimentation that actively involves citizens collaborating with local government. It takes 
as its case study the work of Dublin City Council (DCC) Beta, an initiative in the local 
authority that seeks to develop and implement what Halpern et al (2014) terms ‘test-bed 
urbanism’; that is, experimental interventions in the urban milieu designed to produce new 
products and practices. In the case of DCC Beta it is interventions that will improve the lives 
of local residents, but also enhance the work of the local authority. In particular, Perng 
focuses attention on a ‘collaborative infrastructuring’ project in which the local residents, 
artists, hackers from Code for Ireland, and city staff worked together. The project involved 
painting what seem like mundane street infrastructure – traffic light control boxes. However, 
these boxes attract graffiti and stickers which, as well as being ugly, produce a cleaning cost. 
Enabling artists to paint the boxes, and producing an app that would allow people to find 
them, would provide a public exhibit for the artist, enhance the visual appearance of the area, 
strengthen place identity, and save the council money. As he details, undertaking 
collaboration and experimentation, and aligning diverse viewpoints and practices is not 
straightforward, but can be immensely productive in terms of enhancing a sense of 
participation, value and trust in urban management and development. He concludes that the 
process of collaborative infrastructuring, while not without its challenges, has the potential to 
create a more inclusive means of creating smart cities. 
Similarly, Duncan McLaren and Julian Agyeman examine the constitution of more 
citizen-orientated smart cities through the lens of sharing. Noting the various criticisms of 
smart cities detailed in other chapters in the book, they examine the notion that smart cities 
should become sharing cities. They detail, however, that the ethos and practice of sharing 
comes in different guises, detailing four broad types: commercial, monetized platforms (e.g., 
Uber and Airbnb); non-for-profit, peer-to-peer and communal platforms (e.g., Streetbank and 
Freecycle); commercial, social-cultural (rather than exclusive platform mediated) exchanges 
(e.g. Enspiral and Bitcoin); and communal, social-cultural exchanges such as sharing within 
families and communities. They note that these forms of sharing produce different forms of 
smart sharing city models, with commercial platforms prevailing in Anglo-Saxon cultures, 
while in Latin cultures, especially in South America, urban commoning is facilitated. 
Elsewhere in Europe and Asia, a range of hybrid forms exist. In the final part of the chapter, 
they compare what they term ‘smart sharing cities’, ones that prioritise the values of smart 
cities, such as being efficient, functional, and well-controlled, designed to produce economic 
development and treating people as consumers; with ‘social urbanism’ that holds the values 
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of being effective, diverse, and resilient, designed to produce social inclusion and treating 
people as citizens. They contend that rather than producing smart cities rooted in the values 
of the sharing economy and serving the interests of elites and corporations, smart cities 
should be fair, just, equitable, sustainable and democratic, grounded in the ideas of social 
urbanism. 
In contrast to the focus on citizenship, Maria Helen Murphy considers the privacy 
implications of smart cities from the perspective of the law, and in particular the new EU 
General Data Protection Regulation. She notes that the smart city poses particular problems 
for data protection and privacy because the issues of notice and consent are difficult to deal 
with in practice as people move through environments saturated with networked sensors, 
actuators, and cameras that generate huge volumes of data about them. She maps out some of 
these challenges, existing approaches to dealing with them, and the approach advocated by 
the GDPR and its likely effects. In particular, she considers the introduction of a privacy-by-
design mandate and the roll that pseudonymisation might play as a privacy enhancing 
technique. These two approaches to protecting privacy are framed as ‘positive-sum’, in that 
they are pro-privacy but also pro-progress and the use of smart city technologies. However, 
she notes that while their use will be beneficial, they are not a panacea for the data protection 
and ethical challenges of smart cities. Of course, GDPR also relates solely to the Member 
States of the EU and significant privacy infringing practices will continue within and across 
other countries.  
Leighton Evans takes a different tack, considering privacy from a phenomenological, 
behavioural, epistemological, and practical aspect of daily life perspective. In other words, 
rather than focus on the law and how privacy can be regulated in an era of smart city 
technologies, he draws attention to how the nature of privacy is being transformed, with the 
nature of the public and private sphere altering. He contends that traditionally privacy has 
been spatially separated, with spaces such as the home being private spheres. In the era of 
pervasive and ubiquitous computation, wherein networked computation becomes embedded 
into all manner of previously analogue objects and systems, and computation is available 
anywhere and on the move, spaces that were previously private are now becoming subject to 
a surveillance gaze that operates on an almost continual basis. Privacy then is transformed 
from a property of spatial boundaries, to one of orientation towards technology. Smart city 
technologies then are transforming not only the limits of privacy, but the very notion of 
privacy itself. In creating smart cities, such considerations have to date been absent or been 
dealt with fairly lackadaisically, yet they raise fundamental ethical and moral concerns. 
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Indeed, as Kitchin (2016) details, the ethical implications of smart cities are profound and 
require re-dress in ways that extent beyond legal remedies if the trust of citizens in such 
endeavours is to be maintained, especially in the wake of a series of data breaches and 
scandals such as Snowden revelations and Cambridge Analytica’s misuse of personal 
information. 
As well as creating privacy risks and harms, smart city technologies are also 
vulnerable to security risks. In Chapter 16, Martin Dodge and Rob Kitchin examine the 
paradox that creating smart cities is promoted as a means to effectively counter and manage 
risks to cities, yet the technologies used create new vulnerabilities and threats by making city 
infrastructure and services open to hacking and cyberattacks, malware and viruses, and 
software bugs and data errors. They identify five forms of vulnerabilities with respect to 
smart city technologies – weak software security and data encryption, the use of insecure 
legacy systems and poor ongoing maintenance, system interdependencies and large and 
complex attack surfaces, cascade effects, and human error and deliberate malfeasance of 
disgruntled (ex)employees – and detail illustrative examples of security breaches. In the latter 
half of the chapter they explore how these vulnerabilities are presently being tackled via a 
technically-mediated mitigation approach, how this might be extended to include a wider set 
of mitigation tactics, and how such tactics might be enacted and enforced through market- 
and government-led regulations. In addition, they make the case for a more radical 
preventative strategy to security. They conclude that unless sufficient attention is paid to 
improving the cybersecurity of smart cities we will create fragile urban systems that are 
vulnerable to severe disruption – which, ironically, is far from the anticipated disruptive 
innovation smart city technologies are meant to produce. 
 
Conclusion 
Whether the term ‘smart cities’ will have longevity or be replaced by another label, the use 
and promotion of networked ICTs in managing and governing cities, fostering economic 
development, and mediating everyday life is set to continue into the future. Indeed, urban 
systems and infrastructure, and many of the tasks undertaken daily, are already reliant on and 
overdetermined by digital technologies (Kitchin and Dodge 2011). How these technologies 
are conceived, developed, promoted and implemented matters to future urbanism – how cities 
will be planned, built, and run. It is important then that critical attention is paid not only to 
the technical and instrumental aspects of creating smart cities, but also their politics, ideology 
and ethics. As the essays in this collection highlight, there is a need to consider how smart 
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cities can be reimagined, reframed and remade, both in general terms and with respect to 
specific issues and initiatives.  
This is a task that Rob Kitchin tackles in the concluding chapter. He details six ways 
in which smart cities can be productively recast that seek to leverage the benefits of using 
urban technologies while reimaging and reframing how they are conceived and pursued and 
remaking how they are deployed so they are underpinned by an alternative rationale and 
ethos that is more emancipatory, empowering and inclusive. Three of his suggestions concern 
normative and conceptual thinking with regards to goals, cities and epistemology; and three 
concern more practical and political thinking and praxes with regards to 
management/governance, ethics and security, and stakeholders and working relationships. 
His contribution does not seek to be prescriptive, but rather aims to provide conceptual and 
practical suggestions and stimulate debate about how to productively reimagine smart 
urbanism and the creation of smart cities.  
The essays in this collection provide a springboard for the kind of debate we think is 
needed if we are going to produce smart cities that serve all of their citizens and tackle 
effectively urban issues. While some might bemoan that there is already too much dissent and 
critique of smart cities, we would disagree. Urban centres are the places where most people 
on the planet live and where most work and consumption happens. It is vital that we seek to 
create effective, attractive and inclusive smart cities, rather than ones that perpetuate or 
deepen inequalities by serving only some interests. That means identifying shortcomings in 
present approaches and proposing alternative visions and agendas (see also Townsend 2013; 
Kitchin 2015a; Luque-Ayala and Marvin 2015; Willis and Aurigi 2018). The chapters that 
follow seek to do both and we encourage readers to move outside their comfort zones, to 
engage with the ideas presented and to be reflexive, challenging their own thinking and 
praxis, in order to consider the ways in which they might productively reimagine, reframe 
and remake smart cities. 
 
Notes 
1. http://progcity.maynoothuniversity.ie/ 
2. Compiled from Giffinger et al. (2007); Hollands (2008); Cohen (2012); Townsend (2013) 
3. Compiled from Cerrudo (2015); Datta (2015); Dodge and Kitchin (2005); Elwood and Leszczynski (2013); 
Graham (2005); Greenfield (2013); Hill (2013); Kitchin (2014); Kitchin and Dodge (2011); Kitchin et al. 
(2015); Mattern (2013); Morozov (2013); Shelton et al. (2015); Townsend (2013); Vanolo (2014). 
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